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Although it has become a high-profile term, racial profiling is
difficult to authoritatively define. The term often describes the
use of race as the motivating factor for traffic stops, but this definition has been criticized as too limited in context.1 The End
Racial Profiling Act (ERPA), proposed several times in Congress, offers a much broader definition of racial profiling:
* May 2008 graduate of Florida A&M University College of Law; Editor-inChief of the Florida A&M University Law Review. B.S. University of Florida, summa cum laude, 2002. I would like to thank my husband, Tom Singer,
without whose support I would not have survived law school.
1 Reginald T. Shuford, Civil Rights in the Next Millenium: Any Way You Slice
It: Why Racial Profilingis Wrong, 18 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 371, 380 &
372 n.7 (1999).
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the practice of a law enforcement agent relying, to
any degree, on race, ethnicity, religion, or national
origin in selecting which individuals to subject to
routine or spontaneous investigatory activities, or
in deciding upon the scope and substance of law
enforcement activity following the initial investigatory procedure, except where there is trustworthy information, relevant to the locality and time
frame, that links persons of a particular race,
ethnicity, religion, or national origin to an identi2
fied criminal incident or scheme.
In American criminal law, probable cause must justify
searches and seizures by government agents, 3 and the standard
of proof required to convict a person of a crime has long been
"beyond a reasonable doubt." 4 In comparison, the ERPA definition suggests that race, ethnicity, religion or national origin acts
as a substitute for probable cause. 5 Definitions similar to but less
thorough than that used by ERPA have been proposed by legal
scholars 6 and by bills introduced in state legislatures, such as
Minnesota's Bill. 7 Other scholars suggest that racial profiling is
simply the use of race as a "proxy" for criminality.8 Because the
ERPA definition is more detailed and allows for the use of race
when police receive trustworthy information, such as a descripEnd Racial Profiling Act of 2005 (ERPA), S. 2138 § 3(6), 109th Cong.
(2005). This paper will rely on the ERPA definition when referring to racial
profiling.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2

4

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970).

William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Frameworkfor Combating Racial Profiling, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17, 30 (2004).
6 Shuford, supra note 1, at 372 n.7 (citing Professor Randall Kennedy).
7 Kevin Voss, Justice in a Changed World: Legislative Study: EliminatingRacial Profiling in Minnesota, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 869, 870 (citing S.F.
386 82nd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2001) (as introduced)).
8 Carter, supra note 5, at 30. See also Jeremiah Wagner, Racial (De)Profiling:
Modeling a Remedy For Racial Profiling After the School Desegregation
Cases, 22 LAW & INEQ. 73, 78 (2004).
5
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tion of a suspect by a witness that includes race, the term racial
profiling in this paper refers to the ERPA definition.
THE HISTORY OF RACIAL PROFILING

The events of September 11, 2001, and the course of the war
on terror sparked a renewed national debate on racial profiling,
but the problem is not a new one. 9 The idea that racial identity
can be effectively substituted for criminal identity was applied to
African Americans in the infancy of American slavery. 10 The
"image of blacks as possessing uncontrollable, innate urges for
criminality and violence" continues to plague African Americans. 11. Since that time, the concept has been adapted to fit persons of Japanese and, more recently, Arab descent. During
World War I, some considered Japanese citizens to be innately
untrustworthy and disloyal to the United States.12 Since 9/11,
13
some individuals stereotype Arabic people as terrorists.
Long before 9/11, the U.S. government forced thousands of
Japanese citizens from their homes during World War 11.14 The
government used "military necessity" to justify Executive Order
9066, which allowed the Secretary of War and his designees to
use their discretion to identify military sensitive areas and to exclude from those areas persons who posed a threat to national
security.15 Without any direct evidence of such threats, the U.S.
9 See generally Sherry F. Colb, The New Face of Racial Profiling: How Terrorism Affects the Debate, FindLaw's Writ, Oct. 10, 2001, http://writ.news.find
law.com/colb/20011010.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).
10 Carter, supra note 5, at 17.
11 Id. at 57.

See Huong Vu, Us Against Them: The Path to National Security is Paved
by Racism, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 661, 673 (2002); Colb, supra note 9.
13 See generally Leadership Conference on Civil Rights Education Fund,
Wrong Then, Wrong Now: Racial Profiling Before and After September 11,
2001, (2007), http://www.civilrights.org/publications/reports/racial-profiling/
(last visited Feb. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Wrong Then, Wrong Now].
14 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 & 226 (1944).
15 Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).
12

Volume 1, Number 2
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016

Spring 2008
3

DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 5

DePaul Journal fror Social Justice

2-96

military treated all persons of Japanese descent as probable
spies and saboteurs based on the bare assumption that there
were disloyal persons hidden among them. 16 To prevent suspected activity, officials subjected those of Japanese ancestry
first to a curfew and later to exclusion from their homes and
17
internment at various camps.
One of the unfortunate victims of this sweeping generalization was Fred Korematsu, who was convicted of knowingly violating the exclusion order that forced him from his home.18 The
Supreme Court upheld his conviction based "on the finding...
that Fred Korematsu was not removed from his home 'because
of hostility to him or his race' but because the United States was
at war with Japan and the military 'feared an invasion of our
West Coast."' 19 Legal scholars, then and since, strongly criticize
the Korematsu decision as being overly deferential to the gov20
ernment's assertion of military necessity.
Executive Order 9066, as applied, was exceedingly overbroad.
It applied to Japanese residents and citizens without qualification and essentially substituted race for facts or circumstances
reasonably suggesting disloyalty. 21 The act of internment goes
16 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218.
17 Id. at 217.
18 Exclusion Order 34 "directed that after May 9, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry should be excluded from" San Leando, California. This order
was "substantially based upon Executive Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407
...[which was] issued after we were at war with Japan [and which] declared
that 'the successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection
against espionage and against sabotage to national-defense material, national-defense premises, and national-defense utilities."' Id. at 216-17.
19 S.Res. 126, 109th Cong. (2005) (enacted).
20 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 233-48 (Murphy, Roberts and Jackson, J., dissenting). See also Liam Braber, Comment, Korematsu's Ghost: A Post-September
11th Analysis of Race and National Security, 47 VILL. L. REV. 451, 485 & 485
n.189 (2002).
21 Colb, supra note 9 ("Anyone of Japanese descent residing on the pacific
[sic] coast of the United States was presumed to be a traitor and accordingly
placed in what were essentially prisoner-of-war camps.").
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far beyond "routine ... spontaneous investigatory activities,) 22
such as the stops and searches generally contemplated in racial
profiling today, but it still serves as an example of the extremes
that are possible when the underlying premise of racial profiling
is accepted without question. Korematsu's loyalty to the United
States was never in question, but his race made him a criminal
23
nevertheless.
In 1980, Congress established the Commission on Wartime
Relocation and Internment of Civilians to review government
actions following the issuance of Executive Order 9066.24 Although the Commission concluded that "the decision in Korematsu lies overruled in the court of history," the Supreme Court
has yet to explicitly overturn the decision. 25 Justice Jackson eloquently and perceptively captured the problem in his Korematsu
dissent, stating, "[t]he Court for all time has validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting American citizens. The principle then lies about like a
loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can
26
bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need."
Since Korematsu, racial profiling claims in conventional
crimes have met with little success in the lower courts. 27 Courts
consider pretextual stops, which are objectively justifiable even
22

ERPA, supra note 2.

23

Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.

Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians Act, 94
Stat. 964 (1980).
25 Braber, supra note 20, at 485 and n.189.
26 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246.
27 Wagner, supra note 8, at 99 n.192 (citing various cases). The author of this
paper was unable to locate any cases with a final decision holding that racial
profiling in fact took place. The closest rulings found were those denying
motions to dismiss and holding that a colorable claim had been presented.
24

One example is Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, wherein the 6th Circuit Court

of Appeals ruled that the plaintiffs had produced sufficient evidence of racial
profiling to proceed to a jury trial, but the case was settled following that
decision. 410 F.3d 810 (6th Cir. 2005). See also White v. Williams, 179 F.
Supp. 2d 405 (D.N.J. 2002).
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though occasioned by an officer's ulterior motive, reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. As a result, racial profiling victims rarely receive the remedy of evidence suppression.28 The
Supreme Court held that racial profiling claims are covered by
the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, thereby
requiring a showing that the government agency involved had a
purposefully discriminatory policy in order for relief to be
granted. 29 In such a case, meeting the burden of proof will be
30
difficult for plaintiffs, if not impossible.
Despite little accomplishment in the private arena, the Department of Justice's pattern or practice investigations of discrimination did result in a number of consent decrees. 31 Consent
decrees typically require the subject police agency to engage in
data collection and ongoing review to evaluate compliance with
recommended procedures designed to eliminate racial prejudice
as a factor in law enforcement decisions.32 Unfortunately, "consent decrees . . . have been slow to [put an end to] racial
33
profiling."

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813-14 (1996).
Wagner, supra note 8, at 82.
30 See R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug
War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571, 600 (2003) ("racial profiling is clearly unconstitutional only if irrational"). See generally Amnesty Int'l, Threat and Humiliation: Racial Profiling, Domestic Security, and Human Rights in the United
States 32 (2004) (citing Brown v. Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 337 (2d Cir. 1999)),
available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/racial-profiling/report/rp-report.pdf
[hereinafter Threat and Humiliation].
31 ERPA, supra note 2 at § 2(8) ("[A]s of November 15, 2000, the Department of Justice had 14 publicly noticed, ongoing, pattern or practice investigations involving allegations of racial profiling and had filed five pattern and
practice lawsuits involving allegations of racial profiling, with four of those
cases resolved through consent decrees.").
32 See Wagner, supra note 8, at 81 n.57 (citing White v. Williams, 179 F.
Supp. 2d 405, 413-14 (D.N.J. 2002) (describing the provisions of a consent
decree entered into between the Department of Justice and the State of New
Jersey)).
33 Wagner, supra note 8, at 104.
28
29
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PUBLIC AFITUDE TOWARD RACIAL PROFILING

In the years leading up to 9/11, prevailing public sentiment
generally disfavored the use of racial profiling. 34 In 1999, polls
indicated that 81% of the public disapproved of the use of racial
profiling by police. 35 Perceptions of the frequency of its use in
law enforcement vary widely by race, however. 36 Shortly before
9/11, in July 2001, a Gallup poll exposed a significant disparity
between whites and blacks in terms of perception of the prevalence of racial profiling - 55% of whites believed it was widespread compared to 83% of blacks. 37 Further, although whites'
perceptions did not change between 1999 and 2001, blacks' perceptions rose from 77% to 83%.38
After 9/11, public attitude toward racial profiling shifted
somewhat. The 9/11 terrorists were all Arabic men originating
from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Lebanon. 39 This led many to believe that racial profiling as a law enforcement tool, especially in the context of terrorism, is "just
common sense." 40 Nonetheless, more than half (53%) of those
polled in 2002 were unwilling to go as far as requiring Arabs,
including U.S. citizens, to carry a special ID.41 However, the
34 Frank Newport, Racial Profiling is Seen as Widespread, Particularly
Among Young Black Men, Gallup News Service, Dec. 9, 1999, available at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/3421/Racial-Profiling-Seen-Widespread-Particularly-Among-Young-Black-Men.aspx (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).
35
36

Id.

Frank Newport, Black-White Relations in the United States 2001 Update,
The Gallup Poll, July 10, 2001, at 19 available at http://media.gallup.con/

GPTB/specialReports/sr010711.PDF.
37
38

Id.

39

Dafna Linzer, A Yea'r Later, the 19 Hijackers are Still a Tangle of Mystery,

Id.

Associated Press, Aug. 19, 2002.
40 See generally David A. Harris, Racial Profiling Revisited: "Just Common
Sense" in the Fight Against Terror?, 17 CRIM. JuST. 36 (2002).
41 Darren K. Carlson, Civil Rights: A Profile in Profiling, The Gallup Poll,
July 9, 2002, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/6361/Civil-Rights-Pro-

file-Profiling.aspx (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).
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events of 9/11 gave some measure of social acceptability to the
racial profiling of persons who are, or appear to be, of Arabic
descent. This is revealed by the fact that 53% of respondents
favored requiring all Arabs, including American citizens, to undergo special, more intensive security checks before boarding
airplanes in the United States.42 Disparate beliefs about the
prevalence of racial profiling persisted in the 2002 poll, with
"blacks and Hispanics in the United States ...more likely than
whites to believe the practice of racial profiling is widespread
.... , However, minorities were not uniform in their opinions
of whether such practices are ever justifiable, with Hispanics
generally more likely than blacks to believe the practices were
justified.44 In addition, the 2002 poll indicated that reports of
unfair treatment by police increased slightly since before 9/11:
One in five blacks (22%) say that they have been
unfairly treated in dealings with police, such as
traffic incidents within the last 30 days because
they are black. Such reports of unfair treatment by
police have [also] inched upward since this question was first asked in 1997 (from 15% to 22%).45
Interestingly, post-9/11 polls revealed that, although the majority of Americans believe that police and the criminal justice
system respect the rights of all people in general, the public believes some racial groups' civil rights receive more respect than
others:
More than eight in 10 Americans (82%) believe
the civil rights of whites are respected, and 73%
believe the same is true for Asians. Significantly
fewer believe that the rights of blacks or Hispanics
are respected: 62% for blacks and 63% for Hispanics. And just over half believe the criminal jus43

Id.
Id.

44

Id.

45

Id.

42
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tice system respects the rights of Muslims (55%)
and Arabs (53%).46
EFFECTIVENESS OF RACIAL PROFILING OUTSIDE

THE CONTEXT OF TERRORISM

Is racial profiling an effective law enforcement tool in catching everyday criminals? Aside from a witness's suspect description, which is excluded from the definition of racial profiling,47
police use two general types of profiling involving race in the
course of ordinary investigations. The first type is criminal profiling, which uses behavioral analysis to create a suspect description, such as a serial killer profile.48 The ERPA definition
provides an example of the second type of profiling. 49 Law enforcement uses criminal profiling to identify suspects of known
crimes, whereas officers typically use racial profiling to search
for unknown suspects of crimes that police merely believe have
been or are being committed. 50 For example, the first type of
profiling would involve a police officer seeing a white man who
otherwise fits the profile developed from a known crime and
who is engaged in behavior that reasonably causes suspicion.51
The police officer then decides to stop the man for questioning.
An example of the second type would involve a police officer
Id.
ERPA, supra note 2 (making an exception from the definition of racial
profiling for "trustworthy information" regarding an "identified criminal incident or scheme.").

46

47

48

See Chet K.W. Pager, Lies, Damned Lies, Statistics and Racial Profiling,

13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 515, 542 (2004) (discussing the use of race as a
factor in serial killer profiles).
49 ERPA, supra note 2. See generally Gene Callahan & William Anderson,
The Roots of Racial Profiling, Reason Magazine, Aug.-Sept. 2001 (describing

a typical example of racial profiling in a traffic stop), available at http://www.
reason.com/0108/fe.gc.the.shtml) (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).

Milton Heumann & Lance Cassak, Profiles in Justice? Police Discretion,
Symbolic Assailants, and Stereotyping, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 911, 917 (2001).
50

See Heumann & Cassak, supra note 50 (example based on the serial killer
profile).
51
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seeing an African American man simply driving a car on the
highway. The police officer then decides to pull him over to
5
search for evidence that he has committed some crime. 2
Problems in the effectiveness of criminal profiling can occur
53
when the major focus of the profile is race or ethnicity.
ERPA's proposed language intended to eliminate racial profiling based on bias but did not specifically address behavioral or
psychological profiles that include race. 54 However, it is interesting to note that even in the context of relatively reliable criminal
profiles, overemphasis of race as a factor has been ineffective in
at least two high-profile cases. The initial profile of the D.C.
sniper was based on a white male serial killer profile.5 5 This case
provides an excellent example of the potential costs of relying
too heavily on a race-based profile, even a statistically supported one. 56 Police may well have had the real culprits within

their reach at roadblocks after each shooting before they finally
realized that the killers they were searching for were black, not
7
white.5
More than 100 years before the D.C. sniper case, a Secret Service agent overlooked President McKinley's assassin because he
admittedly focused his attention on an African American man

52

See id. (example based on the typical reported experience of driving while

black or brown.) As indicated in the discussion of racial profiling definitions,
this is not the only situation that would constitute racial profiling, but it does
serve as a ready example.
53 Id. at 925.
54

ERPA, supra note 2 (making an exception from the definition of racial

profiling for "trustworthy information" regarding an "identified criminal incident or scheme.").
55 See Threat and Humiliation, supra note 30, at 24; Jeffrey Gettleman, The
Hunt for a Sniper. The Profiling: A Frenzy of Speculation Was Wide of the
Mark, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2002.
56 Id.
57 Id.

Volume 1, Number 2
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol1/iss2/5

Spring 2008
10

Singer: Race IPSA? Racial Profiling, Terrorism and the Future

Racial Profiling, Terrorism and the ruture

303

of whom he was suspicious and who turned out to be a former
58
law enforcement officer.
The use of racial profiling is based on an assumption that certain characteristics, such as race, go hand in hand with criminality.59 Law enforcement officers who know certain characteristics
of a suspect need not waste their time with people who do not
have those characteristics and can instead focus on the "right"
people.60 It does not constitute racial profiling to focus on members of a particular race if law enforcement officers have a reliable description of a suspect that includes race. 61 Absent such a
description, whether such behavior is racial profiling depends on
two key differences that exist between racial profiling and criminal profiling. The first difference is that in criminal profiling, if
race is used at all, it is simply one factor among many others,
such as psychological or behavioral traits.62 The second difference is timing - racial profiling takes place before a crime is
known to have been committed, 63 as part of a crime-fighting
strategy.

64

Traffic stop studies analyzed through the lens of racial
demographics demonstrate that racial profiling does indeed take
58 Threat and Humiliation, supra note 30, at 23-24 (citing Eric Rauchway,

Murdering McKinley: The Making of Theodore Roosevelt's America 18 (Hill
and Wang 2003)).
59 United States Department of Justice, Fact Sheet. Racial Profiling, 1, June
17, 2003.
60 Id. at 3.
61 Id.

62 See generally Callahan, supra note 49.

Id. (discussing distinctions between case probability and class probability
in profiling).
64 Anthony E. Muchetti, Driving While Brown: A Proposalfor Ending Racial Profiling in Emerging Latino Communities, 8 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 7
(2005). It should be noted that the cited paper uses the term "criminal profiling" to describe only those situations where a suspect description exists and
does not consider the use of behavioral or psychological profiles involving
63

race.
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place. 65 Because hit rate studies - studies revealing how often
police find contraband on a subject - show race is not an effective predictor of crime, using racial profiling does not make
sense. 66 In the past, law enforcement relied upon drug usage
data to support a heavier focus on minorities, citing the strong
public interest in catching cocaine users and dealers. Older studies indicated drug users were disproportionately minorities and
inferred the same for dealers, 67 but more recent data indicates
that African Americans use cocaine at about the same rate as
whites. 68 The results of these studies prompted some to suggest
that this type of profiling might be more accurately termed "lazy
69
law enforcement."
In December 2003, R. Richard Banks, an associate professor
at Stanford Law School, presented several criticisms of hit rate
studies and their interpretation.70 Banks asserted that the results
of these studies have been misinterpreted as evidence of actual
crime rates, rather than simply "the accuracy of the stop-search
Peter Verniero & Paul H. Zoubek, N. J. Office of the Att'y Gen., Interim
Report of the State Police Review Team Regarding Allegations of Racial Pro65

filing, 4 (1999).
Shuford, supra note 1, at 378. See also American Civil Liberties Union,
Sanctioned Bias: Racial Profiling Since 9/11, 2 (Feb. 2004). But see Banks,
supra note 30, at 582.
66

67

Banks, supra note 30, at 581 & 581 n.52 ("The survey evidence, however,

does appear to indicate that black and Latino adults are more likely than

whites to frequently use cocaine, which poses a much greater risk of a fatal
overdose than marijuana (the most commonly used drug) .... The survey
findings indicate that blacks are nearly twice as likely as whites to have used
cocaine during the month prior to the survey.").
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Office of Applied Studies, Results from
the 2004 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Illicit Drug Use Tables,
Table 1.43b (2004), available at http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/NSDUH/2k4
68

nsduh/2k4tabs/SectlpeTabslto66.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
Paul Butler, Associate Professor, George Washington University Law
School, Speech at the National Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence
Proceedings: Racial Profiling (July 10, 2000), available at http://www.ojp.us69

doj.gov/nij/topics/forensics/events/dnamtgtranslO/trans-ll.html

(last visited

Apr. 6, 2008).
70 Banks, supra note 30, at 582.
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process. '71 Banks argued that because reported hit rates typically exceed the range of plausible crime rates, "officers [must
be] select[ing] individuals for investigation at least partly on the
basis of criteria actually related to criminality."72 However,
Banks did not offer examples of either the crime rates that
might be considered "plausible" or the specific "criteria related
to criminality" that might have been used. In addition, the State
Police Review Team Report, which Banks cited, specifically
warned that the sample size used was too small to generalize any
conclusions based on the calculated hit rate. 73
The primary support offered for Banks' assertions of implausibly high hit rates comes from a study by the U.S. Customs Service, 74 which raises the question of the applicability of this
argument to hit rate studies involving highway traffic stops. Logically, the customs environment allows more opportunities for
law enforcement officers to observe suspicious behavior than
highway traffic. It is difficult to imagine that readily observable
behavior that might justify a stop, such as speeding, would be a
reliable predictor of a driver engaging in drug trafficking. The
intended implication appears to be that race, in and of itself, is a
criterion related to criminality, 75 but Banks did not offer any direct support for the implied relationship. Banks also raised the
issue of possible underestimation of minority drug use as a limitation of the survey data and studies conducted between 1998
and 2002, but recent versions of these studies may have addressed these issues by increasing sample size and response
rate. 76
71

Id.

72

Id. The exact criteria related to criminality are not specified.
Verniero, supra note 65, at 28.

73

Banks, supra note 30, at 583.
Id. at 584 ("This difficulty is compounded if race is related to criminality.")
(emphasis added).
76 Id. at n.50. See also Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Office of Applied
Studies, Results from the 2004 National Survey on Drug Use and Health:
Nat'l Findings Appendix A, 107 & 145 (2004).
74

75
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Perhaps the most damning assessment of racial profiling as a
law enforcement tool for conventional crimes comes from law
enforcement officers themselves:
Racial profiling ... is one of the most ineffective
strategies, and I call it nothing less than lazy,
sloppy police work. It's basically saying you don't
want to learn about your community, you don't
want to learn about people's behavior, you don't
want to do your job, and don't want to investigate,
you just want to stop a lot of people and see if you
can come up with some statistical number at the
end of the evening . . .77
EFFECTIVENESS OF RACIAL PROFILING IN

THE CONTEXT OF TERRORISM

In the everyday criminal world, the cost of failure to catch or
imprison a criminal might, at worst, be "measured in individual
deaths." 78 The stakes may be significantly higher for failure to
catch or imprison a terrorist. 79 If racial profiling is effective in
preventing terrorism, it can be argued that the large number of
lives at risk from any one attack justifies its use and that the
practice should be considered acceptable in such extreme
situations.
COULD RACIAL PROFILING HAVE PREVENTED

9/11?

The uniformity of ethnicity among the 9/11 hijackers led some
people to believe not only that racial profiling is an acceptable
law enforcement tool in the context of investigating terrorism,
Threat and Humiliation, supra note 30, at 21 (quoting the testimony of
Captain Ron Davis, Oakland Police Department, Nat'l Organization of Black
Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE), Oakland, CA, Sept. 9, 2003).
78 ALAN DERSHOWITZ, PREEMPTION: A KNIFE THAT CUTS BOTH WAYS 23
(W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. 2006).
77

79

Id.
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but also that it might have made a difference on 9/11. 80 Of
course, any conclusion about the effect racial profiling might
have had on 9/11 would be speculative at best, but a close examination of the events of that day does not seem to support the
theory that racial profiling would have changed the course of
history. Not all of the 9/11 conspirators passed through airport
security without incident. 81 Security subjected two of the hijackers to additional scrutiny based on the recommendation of an
airline employee. 82 After two of the hijackers set off alarms at
the security checkpoints, security checked them with hand
wands and allowed them to pass. 83
Some reports inaccurately stated that the box cutters and pepper spray said to have been used by the 9/11 conspirators were
items allowed on airplanes at that time.84 However, even if airNo official statement to this effect has been made, but speculation exists.
An example is this comment posted b5, Toby Petzold (http://tobypetzold.
com/) to http://www.theleftcoaster.comlcgi-bin/mt-comments.cgi?entry-id=
2207: (July 22, 2004, 04:00 PM) (last visited Feb. 28, 2008): "We know who
the enemy is. And his greatest aids and abettors are those who are so logicimpaired (i.e., hypocritical) and partisan that they can't admit that racial profiling would have saved lives that terrible morning. You can't blame Bush
and the bureaucracy for following the stupid rules against racial "discrimination" that the politically correct imposed upon our society."
80

81 NATIONAL

COMMISSION

ON TERRORIST

ATTACKS

UPON THE

UNITED

9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, 20 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 Commission Report].
82 Id.
83 Id. at 3. The 9/11 Commission Report did indicate that a review of the
videotape of one of the hand screenings revealed sub-standard procedures by
airport security, since the passenger was passed without conclusive identification of the object that triggered the alarm.
84 Associated Press, Pre-9/11 Rules Barred Box Cutters, USA TODAY, Nov.
11, 2002, available at http://www.usatoday.com/travel/news/2002/2002-11-11box-cutters.htm ("ATA spokesman Michael Wascom said only: 'Box cutters
were not prohibited by the FAA on 9-11-01,' and refused to comment further.") (last visited Feb. 28, 2008). In fact, box cutters were prohibited items
by airline industry guidelines, but not by FAA regulations, which referred
only to the length of the blade. Hearing Before the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of
Norman Mineta, Secretary of Transportation), available at http://www.9-11
STATES, THE
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port security stopped and searched all 19 conspirators based
only on their race and found the prohibited box cutters and pepper spray, airport security presumes that most passengers carry
prohibited items inadvertently.8 5 Even today, the Transportation
Security Agency (TSA) does not fine passengers who inadvertently carry prohibited items and instead confiscates such
items.8 6 In the absence of some sort of resistance or other incident, it is unlikely that criminal penalties, fines or denial of
87
boarding would have resulted.
The Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System
(CAPPS),8 8 based on airline reservation systems and designed to
combat the threat of explosive devices in checked luggage, selected seven of the 9/11 hijackers.8 9 Because its focus was on
explosive devices in luggage, CAPPS protocol required that
checked baggage be held back until security confirmed that the
passenger had boarded the plane. 90 CAPPS was not designed to
handle the particular threat posed by suicide hijackers. 91 Furthermore, many of the 9/11 hijackers did not travel with checked
92
baggage.
Assuming the 9/11 hijackers were racially profiled, searched
and relieved of any prohibited items, would that have stopped
commission.gov/archive/hearing2/9-llCommissionHearing-2003-05-23.pdf
at 7.
85 Transportation Security Administration, Civil Enforcement Policies, available at http://tsagov.edgesuite.net/research/laws/editorial_1504.shtm (last visited Apr. 8, 2008).
86

Id.

Id.
9/11 Commission Report, supra note 81, at 2-3 (listing Atta, Suqami, Wail
al Shehri, Waleed al Shehri, Hanjour, al Mihdhar, and Moqed).
89 HearingOf the National Commission on TerroristAttacks Upon the United
States, 108th Cong., (2003) (statement of Jane Garvey, former Administrator,
Federal Aviation Administration), http://www.9-llcommission.gov/archive/
hearing2/9-11CommissionHearing_2003-05-22.pdf. [hereinafter Garvey].
90 9/11 Commission Report, supra note 81, at 3.
91 Garvey, supra note 89 (explaining that the CAPPS system did not require
scrutiny of passengers "beyond examination of their checked baggage.").
92 Garvey, supra note 89.

87
88
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them? During the hearings before the 9/11 Commission, Commissioner John F. Lehman expressed his opinion that "an effective well-trained terrorist doesn't need a knife [and] doesn't
need a box cutter." 93 Given the level of determination required
for a suicide mission like 9/11, it seems unlikely that things
would have been much different had security confiscated the
box cutters.
"RESPONSIVE TO THE ASSESSED THREAT"

Jane Garvey, the former Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, testified before the 9/11 Commission that
the day before the attacks, "aviation security was responsive to
the assessed threat based on information from intelligence and
law enforcement agencies."94 As part of the response to that
threat, the CAPPS system was developed with a focus on explosives contained in luggage, 95 but that system has been severely
criticized for the lack of foresight in its implementation.96 Stephen McHale, the Deputy Administrator of the TSA dismissed
the CAPPS system as old technology, 97 and the 9/11 CommisHearing Of the National Commission on TerroristAttacks Upon the United
States, 108th Cong., (2003) (comment of John F. Lehman, 9/11 Commissioner), http://www.9-1lcommission.gov/archive/hearing2/9-1ICommissionHearing_2003-05-23.pdf.
94 Garvey, supra note 89 (emphasis added).
9- National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Final
Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the Unites
States Executive Summary, available at http://www.9-Ilcommission.gov/report/911ReportExec.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2008) [hereinafter 9/11 Executive Summary].
96 Hearing Of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States, 108th Cong., (2003) (statement of Stephen McHale, Deputy Administrator of the Transportation Security Agency), available at http://www.9-11
commission.gov/archive/hearing2/9-1lCommissionHearing_2003-05-23.pdf;
9/11 Executive Summary, supra note 95.
97 McHale, supra note 96.
93
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sion identified the failure to search CAPPS selectees as one of
the operational failures of 9/11.98
Prior to 9/11, airport security focused on preventing attacks
involving explosives and the mindset for dealing with a hijacking
was to negotiate and secure the safety of the passengers. 99
These policies, based on past events, did not address vulnerabilities that have since been exposed. Nevertheless, even with the
known pitfalls of racial profiling, some officials believe we
should still emphasize race as the determinative factor in our
investigations 0° - in other words, we should continue to look
backward rather than forward. September 11th should have
taught us the fallacy of this reactionary approach.
TSA Deputy Administrator McHale cautioned against the use
of racial profiling in his testimony, instead emphasizing that terrorists have a proven history of using dupes such as women and
children. Thus, racial profiling of an Arab terrorist would have
been ineffective against both Richard Reid and Jose Padilla. 1°1
But even McHale felt that "we pull over too many grandmothers and too many kids" in airport security checks.10 2
While we should learn from past experience, it does not follow that the next terrorist attack will be identical to 9/11, anymore than 9/11 was identical to Pan Am Flight 103.103 Racial
profiling in a national security context was ineffective and ineffi98

9/11 Executive Summary, supra note 95.

99 Garvey, supra note 89.

100 Hearing Of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the

United States, 108th Cong., (2003) (comments of John F. Lehman, 9/11 Commissioner), 115, http://www.9-1lcommission.gov/archive/hearing2/9-11CommissionHearing_2003-05-23.pdf ("[I]f there is an Arab, a young Arab male
or female, and a little old lady from Pasadena, you pick the Arab to pull
aside.").
101 Id. at 104.
102

Id. at 114.

103 Hearing Of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the

United States, 108th Cong., (2003) (statement of Jane Garvey, former Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration), http://www.9-1lcommission.gov/
archive/hearing2/9-1lCommission.Hearing_2003-5-22.pdf.
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cient during World War II, when the only people found guilty of
espionage against the United States were not of Japanese descent.'l 4 In the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, the
inclusion of Arabic interpreters on the federal investigation indicates that investigators sought Arabic terrorists, not the two
Caucasian men who actually set off the bomb. 10 5 Richard Reid,
Jose Padilla and John Walker Lindh all had connections to terrorism or terrorist groups and were of non-Arabic descent and
appearance10 6 These examples demonstrate the problems with
assuming that the next terrorist or group of terrorists to board a
plane or enter a building will look exactly like the perpetrators
of 9/11. Although not officially substantiated, there are reports
of an organization such as Al-Qaeda recruiting white Muslims
from the United Kingdom, Bosnia and Albania. As an organization that is known to be particularly adaptive, these actions
should come as no surprise.107 If anything, the higher risks involved in terrorism make it imperative to avoid lazy law enforcement techniques, which are easily adapted to, and promote,
the very behavior they attempt to prevent.

Threat and Humiliation, supra note 30, at 24 (citing The Hon. Robert
Matsui of California, "Redress for Japanese Internment," remarks to the 99th
Congress, Jan. 3, 1985. 131 Cong. Rec. E 54).
105 Mathieu Deflem, The Globalization of Heartland Terror: International
Dimensions of the Oklahoma City Bombing, paragraph 33, http://www.cas.sc.
edu/socy/faculty/deflem/zokla.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2008). See also Threat
and Humiliation, supra note 30, at 24 n.40 (citing Mary Abowd, Arab-Americans Suffer Hatred After Bombing, CHICAGO SUN TIMES, May 13, 1995, and
Dr. James J. Zogby, President, Arab American Institute, Remarks to the
Open Forum, Washington, D.C., "Arab American Perspectives on the International War Against Terrorism," Dec. 5, 2001, available at http://www.state.
gov/s/p/of/proc/tr/6901.htm) (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).
106 See Threat and Humiliation,supra note 30, at 25. See also Wrong Then,
Wrong Now, supra note 13, at 29.
107 See Sean Rayment, -Whites Being Lured into Islamic Terror, Telegraph.co.uk, Feb. 7, 2006, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/
news/2006/07/02/nterrlO2.xml&sSheet=/news /2006/07102/ixuknews.html (last
visited Feb. 28, 2008). See also Wrong Then, Wrong Now, supra note 13, at 31.
104
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CULTURAL ALIENATION

Racial profiling has other drawbacks besides terrorist adaptation. Racial profiling has the potential to alienate otherwise neutral or loyal Muslims and generate sympathy for the terrorist
cause. 0 8 One must consider whether this could tip the balance
toward creating terrorists similar to the July 7, 2005 London
bombers.10 9 One of the bombing conspirators, Mohammad
Sidique Khan, did not fit the general profile of a young Muslim
fundamentalist. 10° Those who knew him considered him to be
well integrated into English culture, and he did not seem to suffer from "cultural isolation, racial segregation or adolescent religious indoctrination."

'

But the young man, described as a

"Beeston lad, born and bred" by a former classmate, accused
the British government of committing atrocities against-his people all over the world and called Osama bin Laden and Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi heroes in his suicide video.11 2 Khan did not
clarify the specific events in the Middle East to which he referred, but he did discuss "the bombing, gassing, imprisonment
1 3
and torture of [his] people." 1

While racial profiling pales in comparison to bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture, it is evident that extreme anger
over the abuse of fellow Muslims lay at the heart of Khan's personality shift. His suicide video showed that loyalty to English
culture in no way interfered with his decision to become a suicide bomber.11 4 The lingering question surrounding Khan and
the London bombings is this: if he was truly as well integrated
108

Id.

109 Nasreen Suleaman, The Mystery of 'Sid', BBC News, Oct. 19, 2005. See

also Paul Reynolds, Bomber Video 'Points to Al-Qaeda', BBC News, Sept. 2,
2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4208250.stm (last visited Feb.

28, 2008).
110 Id.
111 Id.
112

113
114

Id.
Id.
Id. ("The language he uses is that of a dedicated Al-Qaeda fighter.").
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into English culture as was thought, how could he kill his fellow
countrymen? There may never be a definitive answer to this
question, but it does suggest some level of cultural alienation,
despite the evaluations of his character by friends and
colleagues.
After the bombings, the London press spread reports of
"radicalisation [sic] taking place in local gyms, youth centres,
and Islamic bookshops," and the Muslim community where
Khan lived reportedly became angry and eventually wary. 115
Though no direct connection can ever be definitively made between one man's suicide bombing and a shift to radical fundamentalism by others, it would be foolish to ignore the ripple
effect created in such a close-knit community.
RACIAL PROFILING POLITICS AND LEGISLATION

President George W. Bush, in his first address to a joint session of Congress in February 2001, soundly condemned the
practice of racial profiling: "It's wrong, and we will end it in
America. In so doing, we will not hinder the work of our nation's brave police officers. They protect us every day.... But
by stopping the abuses of a few, we will add to the public confidence our police officers earn and deserve."11 6 Barely a month
later, Rep. Eleanor Holmes Norton (D.C.) introduced the Racial Profiling Prohibition Act of 2001 in the House. The bill was
sent to the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, then to the Subcommittee on Highways and Transit.11 7 Two
months later, Representative Norton introduced the Act again,
11 8
and sent it to committees again, with no further action.
115
116

Id.

George W. Bush, President of the United States, Address of the President to the Joint Session of Congress 147 Cong. Rec. H431 (Feb. 27, 2001).
117 Racial Profiling Prohibition Act of 2001, H.R. 965, 107th Cong. (2001)
147 Cong. Rec. H827 (Mar. 8, 2001).
118 Racial Profiling Prohibition Act of 2001, H.R. 1907, 107th Cong. (2001).
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Four months after President Bush's speech, ERPA was first
introduced in the Senate. 1 9 To date, versions of ERPA have
been introduced in the U.S. Senate three times, with bipartisan
support, and three times it has died in committee.120 In total,
between the House and the Senate, eight bills directly dealing
with racial profiling have been introduced between 2001 and
2005, and none have made it out of committee.121 In February
2004, a resolution calling for Congress and the states to end ra119 End Racial Profiling Act of 2001, S. 989, 107th Cong. (2001).
120 Id. See also End Racial Profiling Act of 2004, S. 2132, 108th Cong. (2004).
121 Details of action taken on bills and resolution dealing with racial profiling introduced into Congress between 2001 and 2005: Racial Profiling Prohibition Act of 2001, H.R. 965, 107th Cong. (2001) - 3/8/2001: Referred to the
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure; 3/9/2001: Referred
to the Subcommittee on Highways and Transit. Racial Profiling Prohibition
Act of 2001, H.R. 1907, 107th Cong. (2001).- 5/17/2001: Referred to the
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure; 5/18/2001: Referred
to the Subcommittee on Highways and Transit. End Racial Profiling Act of
2001, S. 989, 107th Cong. (2001).- 6/6/2001: Introductory remarks on measure.
(CR S5891-5893); 6/6/2001: Read twice and referred to the Committee on the
Judiciary. (text of measure as introduced: (CR S5893-5895); 8/1/2001: Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitution. Hearings held. With
printed Hearing: S.Hrg. 107-537. End Racial Profiling Act of 2001, H.R.
2074, 107th Cong. (2005).) - 6/6/2001: Introductory remarks on measure. (CR
E1037-1038); 6/6/2001: Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary; 7/
16/2001: Referred to the Subcommittee on Crime. Racial Profiling Education and Awareness Act of 2002, S. 2114, 107th Cong. (2002). - 4/11/2002:
Introductory remarks on measure. (CR S2584); 4/11/2002: Read twice and
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary (text of measure as introduced:
CR S2584-2585). Uniting Neighborhoods and Individuals To Eliminate Racial Profiling (UNITE) Act, S. 2112, 108th Cong. (2004) - 2/25/2004: Introductory remarks on measure. (CR S1588-1589); 2/25/2004: Read twice and
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. End Racial Profiling Act of
2004, S. 2132, 108th Cong. (2004) - 2/26/2004: Introductory remarks on measure. (CR S1688); 2/26/2004: Read twice and referred to the Committee on
the Judiciary. (text of measure as introduced: CR S1688-1690). ERPA, supra
note 2 - 12/16/2005: Introductory remarks on measure. (CR S13804-13805);
12/16/2005: Read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. (text
of measure as introduced: CR S13805-13808). The 2005 version of the ERPA
died in committee and has not yet been reintroduced in the 110th Congress.
See also U.S. Senator Russ Feingold, http://www.senate.gov/-feingold/issuesprofiling.html.
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cial profiling was introduced in the House, but even this relatively simple resolution never made it past the Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security.122
Following Congress' failure to act in any significant way on
the four racial profiling bills submitted before February 2002,
former U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft stated that:
"[t]his administration ... has done more to indicate its opposition [to racial profiling] than ever in
history. The President said it's wrong and we'll
end it in America, and I subscribe to that. Using
race ...as a proxy for potential criminal behavior
is unconstitutional, and it undermines law enforcement by undermining the confidence that people
can have in law enforcement."123
For all of the rhetoric about the evils of racial profiling, little
to nothing has been accomplished at the federal level besides
"indicating opposition" to the practice. In contrast, as of March
2001, 11 states had enacted racial profiling legislation, and 13
others had introduced legislation addressing the problem. 124
Since that time, the number of states with legislation dealing
with the issue of racial profiling has nearly tripled. 125 However,
as of September 2004, only two states criminalized the practice
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that Congress and
the States should act to end racial profiling, H. Res. 515, 108th Cong. (2004) 2/4/2004: Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary; 3/1/2004: Referred to the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security.
123 United States Department of Justice, Fact Sheet: Racial Profiling, 1, June
17, 2003 (quoting John Ashcroft, United States Attorney General, Feb. 28,
2002).
124 Memorandum from the Institute on Race and Poverty to Senator Linda
Berglin, Senator Jane Ranum and Representative Greg Gray (March 5, 2001)
(discussing the components of racial profiling legislation), available at http://
wwwl.umn.edu/irp/publications/racialprofiling.html
(last visited Feb. 28,
122

2008).

Racial Profiling Data Collection Resource Center at Northeastern University, Legislation and Litigation, http://www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.
edu/legislation/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).
125
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of racial profiling, and only one created a private cause of action
126
in civil courts.
In 2003, the Department of Justice released a set of guidelines
for law enforcement on the subject of racial profiling, but the
guidelines remain woefully inadequate to remedy the problem
at the federal level.127 These guidelines fall short in several key
areas: they do not apply at the state and local level, they do not
require data collection or provide a means of enforcement, and
the exceptions for immigration and national security remain
overbroad. 128 As discussed above, the use of racial profiling to
prevent terrorism may create more problems than it solves.
There is little, if any, justification for differentiating the use of
racial profiling in the context of national security from the context of everyday criminal investigation.
The significant numbers of people who are racially profiled
but not prosecuted are left with only the meager recourse provided by equal protection jurisprudence. 129 Because of the difficulties in meeting the required burden for potential plaintiffs,
equal protection claims will not likely serve as a deterrent to
racial profiling. 130 The lack of discernable consequences means
that the practice goes unchecked.131 Individuals affected by racial profiling "experience fear, anxiety, humiliation, anger, resentment, and cynicism" toward the criminal justice system, and
"public confidence and trust" in the system decreases as a
result.132
Professor William Carter of Harvard Law School argues that
racial profiling of African Americans constitutes one of the remaining badges of slavery. He also suggests that the Thirteenth
126
127
128
129
130
131
132

Threat and Humiliation, supra note 30, at 41-43.
Threat and Humiliation, supra note 30, at 30-31.
ERPA, supra note 2.
Carter, supra note 5.
Id. at 33.
Id.
ERPA, supra note 2.
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Amendment provides a better means than the Fourteenth
Amendment for putting an end to the practice.133 However, this
type of Thirteenth Amendment analysis would not extend protection to members of races who were not subject to slavery.
While adoption of this reasoning by the courts would certainly
be a step forward for African Americans, it is an incomplete
solution to a problem that has grown beyond the Driving While
Black phenomenon.
ERPA, if passed, would lessen the burden on racially-profiled
plaintiffs by shifting the focus from the subjective intent of the
perpetrator134 to the disparate impact of law enforcement activities on racial and other minorities. 135 The American people
should demand legislative action on the issue of racial profiling
in order to make ourselves, our communities and our nation
safer.
THE FUTURE OF RACIAL PROFILING

Nearly 40 years after he was convicted, Fred Korematsu petitioned for a writ of coram nobis. 136 Korematsu introduced into
evidence documents proving that the government knowingly
Carter, supra note 5, at 87.
Id. at 33 n.86 (citing Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court
133

134

Doctrine, 62

MINN.

L. REV. 1049, 1052 (1978)).

ERPA, supra note 2. As noted above, the ERPA has not yet been reintroduced in the 110th Congress, but history suggests that it will be. The focal
argument of this paper is that it is time Congress gave this matter serious
attention. It is clear that the underlying prejudice and intellectual shortcuts
that often result in racial profiling. are not likely to disappear on their own,
but the injurious behavior of racial profiling merits official action. See Press
Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Sues TSA Official, JetBlue
for Discriminating Against Passenger Wearing Arabic T-Shirt (Aug. 9, 2007),
http://www.aclu.org/freespeech/gen/31266prs2007O8O9.html (last visited Feb.
28, 2008).
136 Korematsu v. United States (Korematsu II), 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal.
135

1984).
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concealed contradictory evidence from the court. 137 The U.S.
District Court determined that senior government officials withheld information regarding their claim of military necessity
when they presented their case. 138 Thus, the court concluded
139
that equity required the granting of Korematsu's petition.
The district court relied heavily on the conclusions of The
Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Citizens
in its decision:
The Commission concluded that at the time of the
issuance of Executive Order 9066 and implementing military orders, there was substantial credible
evidence from a number of federal civilian and
military agencies contradicting the report of General DeWitt that military necessity justified exclusion and internment of all persons of Japanese
ancestry without regard to individual identification of those who may have been potentially disloyal. The Commission found that military
necessity did not warrant the exclusion and detention of ethnic Japanese. It concluded that 'broad
historical causes which shaped these decisions [exclusion and detention] were race prejudice, war
hysteria and a failure of political leadership.' As a
result, 'a grave injustice was done to American citizens and resident aliens of Japanese ancestry who,
without individual review or any probative evidence against them, were excluded, removed and
detained by the United States during World War
11.'140

The court concluded that although it was impossible to say
what effect the concealed evidence might have had on the Su137

Id.

138

Id. at 1417.

139

Id.
Id. at 1416.

140
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preme Court's decision, Korematsu's petition must be
granted. 141 The court recognized that the Korematsu decision
demonstrates how the government cannot be allowed to hide
behind the shield of national security. 42 "[I]n times of international hostility and antagonisms, our institutions, legislative, executive and judicial, must be prepared to exercise their authority
to protect all citizens from the petty fears and prejudices that
are so easily aroused."' 143
In spite of, or more likely because of, the injustice he suffered,
Korematsu became an advocate for civil liberties. 144 After 9/11,
he spoke out against racial discrimination and violence targeting
Arab, Muslim, South Asian, and Sikh Americans. 1 45 He also
cautioned the federal government against making the same mistakes by singling out individuals based on race, ethnicity or religion.146 Shortly after Korematsu's death, the U.S. Senate
passed a resolution honoring his life and advocacy,'1 47 but Congress' failure to produce substantive legislation dealing with the
problems of racial profiling made the resolution ring hollow.
The logical corollary to the idea that some racial groups' civil
rights are respected more than others is that some racial groups'
civil rights are less respected than others. The public's willingness to subject African Americans, Arabs and other minorities
to law enforcement scrutiny on the basis of race alone confirms
this proposition and conjures the ghost of Plessy v. Ferguson.148
In the days of Plessy, pseudoscience supported racial prejudice

143

Id. at 1419.
Id. at 1420
Id.

144

S. Res 126, 109th Cong. (2005).

141
142

Id.
Id.
147 Id.
148 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896) ("Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in accentuating the
145

146

difficulties of the present situation. If the civil and political rights of both
races be equal one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one
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by playing on fears that "Anglo-Saxon heritage" would be di19
luted if distinctions between the races were not respected. 4
When considering the legal propriety of racial profiling, we
should heed the words of Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy:
[I]n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law,
there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil
rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The
humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law
regards man as man, and takes no account of his
surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as
guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are
involved.150
Thankfully, as to segregation, Plessy is no longer controlling
law.151 Nevertheless, because the American government has
misused race for more than three centuries, any new govern152
mental use of race should be suspect.
The government and the people of the United States have
shown a disturbing propensity toward allowing the sacrifice of
fundamental human rights. This sends "the troubling message
that the destruction of four planes and three buildings is cause
enough to sacrifice the spirit of the laws that is fundamental to
this country's self-conception as the Land of the Free." 153 An
Israeli court once stated that:
race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States
cannot put them upon the same plane.").
149 Ho ex rel. Ho v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 854, 863 (9th
Cir. 1998).
150 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (J. Harlan, dissenting).
151 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
152 Ho ex reL Ho, 147 F.3d at 863.
153 Harold Hongju Koh, The Spirit of the Laws, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 23
(2002).
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)2l

Terrorism and the ruture

This is the destiny of a democracy - it does not see
all means as acceptable, and the ways of its enemies are not always open before it. A democracy
must sometimes fight with one hand tied behind
its back. Even so, a democracy has the upper
hand. The rule of law and the liberty of an individual constitute important components of its understanding of security. At the end of the day, they
strengthen its spirit and this strength allows it to
overcome its difficulties.154
Although the Israeli court was commenting on the use of torture, these words apply to a discussion of racial profiling in
America as well. Racial profiling and the resulting loss of constitutionally protected rights violate the spirit of American law.155
As President John F. Kennedy once said, "[t]his Nation was
founded by men of many nations and backgrounds. It was
founded on the principle that all men are created equal, and that
the rights of every man are diminished when the rights of one
man are threatened."156
Korematsu should have taught us that when the government
and the people are under the terrible stress created by an attack
on our nation, we are too willing to sacrifice principles, like
equal protection, in the name of greater safety. 157 In other
words, we prefer to violate rights now and beg forgiveness
later.158 Equal protection jurisprudence has fallen short of what
is required to remedy the problem of racial profiling.159 We need
154 HCJ No. 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture v. General Security
Service (Israel Supreme Court 1999).
155 Braber, supra note 20, at 487.
156 Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy,

1963, 468, available at http://www.bartleby.com/73/219.html (last visited Apr.
6, 2008).
157 Braber, supra note 20, at 473.
158
159

Id.
See Wagner, supra note 8, at 82. See also Banks, supra note 30, at 600

("racial profiling is clearly unconstitutional only if irrational"). See also
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legislation to clearly outline prohibited behaviors and to specify
remedies available to victims of racial profiling in order to hold
us to our ideals in these times of great stress and temptation.
The time has come for the citizens of this country to truly honor
the memory of Fred Korematsu, and many others like him, by
demanding that racial profiling be outlawed.

Threat and Humiliation, supra note 30, at 32 (citing Brown v. Oneonta, 221
F.3d 329, 337 (2d Cir. 1999)).
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